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Abstract 
Differentiation between public and private goods is very complex and difficult. In this 
article, authors overview these definitions and also the theories about private and public 
goods to apply this knowledge in the determination of the social welfare functions of 
forests, the utilization and the tasks of the government. The welfare functions of forests, 
the tasks of the owner and also the way of utilization of the forest is differing between 
public and private forests. This overview can help to determine these functions and 
tasks and also find the best ways of utilization. 
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1. Introduction 
While we studying the social welfare functions of forests, we regularly have to face 
with questions that economically difficult to consider. In case of private forests, the 
owner or user information, individual preferences, short and long-term economic 
interests will help a lot in the choice of the forest utilization, and also in the combination 
of different possibilities that do not exclude each other. In case of forests owned or used 
by the state the situation is basically different, because besides the economical criteria 
of forest utilization other macro economic and social factors have to be considered. 
These include for example the protection of natural environment, national wealth and 
national values, protection of historical relics, the role of tourism in preservation of 
health, the love of nature and also the education of patriotism or just the increase of 
people’s happiness and well-being without the measurable increase of GDP. It can be an 
important task to involve the public goods of private forests (for example blue hiking 
trail, a part in private forest) in free of charge with the help of the state. 
It does not offer solution for the above mentioned problem, but it helps to understand 
it if we overview the theoretical definition of the economic characteristics of certain 
goods (particularly the public goods). We reviewed some important steps of reference 
systems in the history of economical theories and also how they can support the making 
of optimal social decisions. Finally, we return to the starting point and look over how 
they are applicable in the economical award of social welfare utilization of the forests. 
2. Theories about the distinction of private and public goods 
The distinction between private and public goods is a substantive issue in the terms of 
establishing the extent and budged of the government involvement. If we can decide 
irrefutably that something is private or public good, the necessity of state or non-state 
implementation can be clearly assigned. The question is actually occurs in transition 
states: how government participates in the establishment of these? (Of course, we are 
aware that to answer this and also the actual construction, never withdrawal from the 
rights required in the past, can be a barrier of clear economic—rational—consideration.) 
Review the historical alternation of the definition of public good (Blankart, 2011). 
Already SAX from the late Kameralists, draw attention to appropriate the ruler’s 
incomes to revive (also) economy. At the beginning 20th century MAZZOLA and 
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WICKSELL thought the goodness of public good if it was available for someone, it was 
also available for everyone. However WICKSELL draw attention to the annoying 
stowaway behavior that is an optimal strategy individually but it occurs as a problem at 
the social level. The solution would be that all the affected sit down and decided to put 
up the money together. LINDAHL (1919) examined how to finance the production of 
public goods from optimal tax. The most people refer to the definitions that SAMUELSON 
(1954) (Samuelson, 1954) and MUSGRAVE (1959) used, later we will describe the 
categories that they used. BUCHANAN (1968) brought change, he regarded important the 
examination of the manners of common-pool resources. His innovation was considering 
the public consumption of public goods, not like the previous approaches that classified 
the goods according to features (rivalry, excludability). MALINVAUD and DRÊZE (1970–
1971) observed the classification according to the features, but basically make a 
distinction between rivalries; excludability was only a secondary element. JOHANSEN 
(1971), CLARKE and GROVES (1971–1973) applied a decision theory approach 
(Blankart, 2011). In the Hungarian literature STIGLITZ (2000) (Stiglitz, 2000) és 
VÍGVÁRI (2002) (Vígvári, 2002) had similar statements about the definition of public 
goods. 
Classification of goods along two dimensions by BLANKART (2001); according to 
MUSGRAVE (1973) Figure 1. 
 
 Rivalry Non-rivalry 
Excludability Private goods (1) 
Bread, flat 
“Toll” goods (3) 
Television, motorway 
Non-excludability Public goods (2) 
Fishing, downtown streets 
Pure public goods (4) 
Foreign policy 
 
Figure 1 Classification of goods along two equal criteria 
 
To do this classification of certain goods, the decision should be made clearly, for 
example it is characterized by excludability or not, it cannot be said that a „bit” 
excludable. However, for a more analytical work quantifiability—a real scale—needed. 
The tool of measurement can be the marginal cost of the exclude of a non-paying 
consumer (stowaway) or include of a new consumer. If the previous is high exclusion is 
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impossible, if the latter is higher we talk about rivalry. It should be emphasized that 
exclusion always means technical exclusion (for example not moral exclusion). The 
only exception is cost-based impracticability, because the costs of it exceeded the 
deficits of stowaway behavior. 
Rivalry can be explained by the features of the certain good. It reduces the usefulness 
of eat an apple if someone eat from that previously, whilst listening to the radio is an 
experience and will not change if someone else listen it, too. Of course, sometimes 
certain facilities or a certain cultural situation determines the occurrence of competition. 
When we brush our teeth with a toothbrush we do not like to give it to another person, 
but if we clean our shoes with it, give it to other family members does not mean a 
problem. For a Hungarian woman monogamy is natural, but in the earlier Mormon 
world “husband consumption” between wives did not rival. 
In MUSGRAVE approach state does not related to private goods (1), the „invisible 
hand” serves perfectly in their markets, government should not interfere (Musgrave, 
1996). Pure public goods (4) (like national defense, flood control, environmental 
protection, protection of private properties, etc. that benefits for all) in fact relates to the 
state, almost it has obligate rights and it has to provide it. Private production can work 
in a non-profit form or in a very small community (see 1). The other two elements (2 
and 3) of the table, the degree of intervention is a determinative question, need 
consideration of the effects of market and government failures. Public goods (2) include 
fishing (though the fact that the boundaries of international waters in the shoreline 
farther tighten, the degree of exclusion can be increased the coastal countries). 
Downtown streets also belong to the category of public goods, because no one can be 
excluded, but the drivers competing with each other for parking space. In “toll” goods 
(3) exclusion give space for payment, besides when a motorway is not crowded cars do 
not bother each other, and also does not mean a problem that more people watch the 
television at home. 
ZIMMERMANN and HENKE form groups in one dimension, which creates the 
applicability of simple function analysis (Zimmermann and Henke, 2005). They make a 
distinction between private and public goods along rivalry (in intermediate state we can 
speak about mixed goods), in these categories they make distinction according to 
exclusion (still technical and cost-based) (Figure 2). 
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Rivalry Excludability Non-excludability 
Total Private goods 
 Car Crowded street 
Partial Mixed goods 
 Protection of vaccinated Effect on non-vaccinated 
Negative Public goods 
 Non crowded motorway Lighthouse 
 
Figure 2 Degree of rivalry with the subordination of excludability 
 
If vaccines are not mandatory, exclusion is made by only those people get it who 
voluntary go to the doctor. At the same time , if the majority vaccinate themselves to a 
communicable disease, the non-vaccinated also protected, because the risk of infections 
become lower, in this way they cannot be excluded from this major protection. 
Lighthouse is a typical good example for pure public goods, because if it helps to a ship 
in orientation, it would not be less helpful for another or not available, it cannot light for 
just one of them. 
CANSIER and BAYER according to Table 1 create groups in a one dimension scale 
(Cansier and Bayer, 2003). 
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Table 1 The explanation of mixed goods 
 
Pure private goods
Mixed goods 
Pure public goods Quasi-private 
goods 
Quasi-public 
goods 
Excludability and 
rivalry 
– Incomplete 
excludability and 
rivalry (private 
goods with extern 
effect) 
– Excludability and 
missing rivalry 
(club goods) 
– Missing 
excludability but 
rivalry 
– Common-Pool 
(public resources) 
Neither exclusion 
nor rivalry 
– Produced goods 
– Natural goods 
 
The quasi (also called practical) private goods include the private goods that have 
external effects. For example, when an old diesel car passes in front of someone he 
cannot exclude himself from its discomfort. Of course, not all effects are bad: when a 
teacher pays for a PowerPoint course he cannot exclude the students from the positive 
effects of it. Club goods are quasi-private goods that have the possibility of exclusion, 
but there is no rivalry in consumption (till the membership does not reach an extremly 
high level). For example, fishing is a quasi-public good such as a community resource. 
In pure public goods we have to differentiate produced and natural public goods. Clean 
air belongs to the latter category, but if pollution takes the level when cleaning is 
necessary it becomes a produced public good. 
BUCHANAN (1968) examined that consumption is private or public (Cullis and Jones, 
1998). (The problem with this approach is that it does not answer for the question to 
produce the good individually or commonly.) He examined two dimensions. One of 
them is divisibility; the other is the size of the consuming group. Private good is 
consumed individually (in a very small group), everybody has an own part. For 
example, fire-extinguisher in the hall is a partly divisible good, can be consumed in 
small groups (2). Not everyone needs an own fire-extinguisher till the rush does not 
endanger the fire-fighting. Swimming pool is an example for indivisibility (4) that we 
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use individually, but do not parcel it to decide which square is whose. Moderately 
divisible and crowds of people can avail (3) for example vaccine (not everyone avails it, 
but it protects also the others). Pure public goods (5) are indivisible and large groups 
can consume them. 
 
 
Figure 3 Division of consumption 
 
Figure 4 and 5 show the demand of private and public goods (according to Cullis 
and Jones, 1998; and Musgrave, 1996). Da and Db mark the demand of ’a’ and ’b’ 
people’s demand for a certain private good, Da + b is the total demand (Da and Db is the 
horizontal amount). Da’ and Db’ show ’a’ and ’b’ people’s marginal propensity to pay 
for a certain public good, Da + b’ is the vertical amount of them. The optimum is 
Da + b = MC and Da + b’ = MC. 
 
 
Figure 4 Total demand: public decisions and private goods 
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The next figure is the same with the previous, the only difference is that LINDAHL 
marked the marginal propensity to pay for public goods with D, the marginal costs with 
MC. The effective point (Teff, peff) of public good production, and everyone has to pay 
the amount of tax that is equal with his D besides the amount of Teff (in the figure it is 
pA and pB). The problem with the establishment of theoretical balance in practice is that 
we do not know the preferences of certain people and if we ask them they may be say 
lower D to pay lower tax while they use public goods according to their real needs. 
 
 
Figure 5 The balanced amount of public goods in case of LINDAHL-tax 
 
PARETO, KALDOR and HICKS also searched for the balanced solution, they assumed a 
horizontal MC that is usually the same as the price in the optimum. Since we cannot 
divide fairly the costs, simply pay the goods fifty-fifty with the two performers. At this 
time according to the KALDOR–HICKS criteria, when the balance point is the same as 
LINDAHL, ’A’ comes off badly, because besides Teff he pays higher tax than his 
willingness. ’B’ get in the right position because he would be willing to pay more than 
he has to. Under PARETO-criteria produce the amount of TA besides appropriate tax, so 
the total revenue tariff will be p × TA. (This satisfies the conditions of PARETO-efficacy: 
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no one can improve the situation of someone without worsen the situation of someone 
else.) The following figure shows these two solutions. 
 
 
Figure 6 The balanced amount of public goods in case of lump-sum tax 
 
Finally, have a look at what will be the overall balance in the production of private 
and public goods (Cansier and Bayer, 2003). In our model, we examined a binominal 
society (’A’ and ’B’ people), one kind of public (T) and one kind of private goods (X). 
Suppose that ’B’ person’s welfare level is given by IB indifference curve. The concave 
curve from the figure above shows the limit opportunities of the production of T and X 
goods, minus IB we get the cd curve in the figure below. Since the usefulness of ’B’ is 
fixed, we get the balance point with the optimization of the position of ’A’ that will be 
in the tangent point of the residual curve and the IA indifference curve. Here we produce 
public goods in ’M’ (they both consume it, because there is no rivalry), besides this we 
can produce ’N’ amount of private goods (Figure 5). From this ’N’ unit ’F’ remains for 
’B’ (figure above) and remains ’E’ for ’A’ (Figure 6), because of the derivation of cd, it 
is true that: N = E + F. 
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Figure 7 Effective production of private and public goods 
 
In the issue of the efficient production of public goods it is unavoidable and also in 
case of „toll” and „public goods” the previously mentioned stowaway effect is a 
frequent problem, so a significant part of the consumers try to use them while they 
brake out themselves from the burden during production. 
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Stowaway behavior can be clearly pictured with the game theory of the classical 
situation of prisoner’s dilemma. In this case, the parties concerned make decisions about 
goods production isolated from each other (like separated and separately interrogated 
prisoners). They have to consider that the other can act cooperatively or non-
cooperatively. Table 2 shows the possible example of the expected values structure 
(Cansier and Bayer, 2003). 
 
Table 2 The profit of A and B in case of different strategies 
 
 KB 
B cooperating 
NB 
B non-cooperating 
KA, A cooperating 10/10 -10/12 
NA, A non-cooperating 15/-8 0/0 
 
The given numbers show the result of decision for A and B. For example: A can 
choose a cooperative solution KA or a non-cooperative solution NA, B can also do this. 
Do not cooperate is better, because for A 15 > 10 and 0 > 10, for B 12 > 10 and 0 > -8, 
so the dominant strategy will be the non-cooperating. If both of them choose the directly 
favorable solution, the maximal total utility (20 units) will be inaccessible for the 
community. In other words, in case of public goods the so-called NASH-equilibrium (the 
strategic point from which the parties have not to change, because of supposing the 
rational behavior of the other) will be the stowaway behavior. With fair market 
conditions, assuming perfect competition nobody will produce public goods. The total 
utility maximum of the society can be reached with intervention of non-market (usually 
state) tools. Of course, the dominant strategy will be different, if one of the parties can 
force his willing to the other, or they can control the decisions of each other. 
The theory of public goods can help to economically understand better the theory of 
HOBBES about the state contracts. If we define the freedom rooted in internal security as 
a public good, we can understand why the imagined “natural” state lead to anarchy and 
why it is only stop with the intervention of the state. The case of prisoner’s dilemma can 
be applied well for “natural” state. People only think of their own profit and they always 
insult each other’s interests. Who act cooperatively, abstain from insult the other’s 
interests will suffer disadvantages. Based on the previous game “A” and “B” can 
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practice their natural freedom (NA, NB) or they can regard each other (KA, KB), if they 
were at peace with each other, overall it would be better, but the dominant strategy will 
be the fight. HOBBS thinks that the prisoner’s dilemma is solvable at the level of 
arrangement. “B” give up the crossing of interests with the terms that “A” will also do 
this. This agreement can be understood as decentralized consensus quest. HOBBS sees 
the legitimacy of the state that a third party with power is needed who forces “A” and 
“B” to dependably keep the agreement. 
Interesting exception in case of the few goods or in small communities, public goods 
can be developed without external interference. This can occur if the rate of contribution 
increases more than its realized utility for the consumer. The difference between it and 
private goods is that the utility enjoyed by others. In this case, consumers will use the 
disposal income for purchase till the marginal utility exceeded the marginal utility of the 
use of private goods. In small communities, for example in small villages, the other 
participants’ relatively direct control on each other will decrease the possibility of 
stowaway behavior. 
There is a group of goods that does not fit in the previously examined relation system 
that does not belong to public goods, but the need for government’s intervention may 
occur in allocation. MUSGRAVE used the words meritoric and demeritoric goods 
(Musgrave, 1996). 
We talk about meritoric goods if the amount of consumption is not sufficient under 
pure market conditions. With other words, the amount of individual optimum is less 
than the social optimum. Only those goods are demeritoric that the society—due to the 
individual optimization—consumes in a higher amount, than the level that is optimal for 
the community. Use of the seat-belt is a typical example of meritoric goods, at the same 
time traveling by car is demeritoric. The theoretical analyses of meritoric goods pay 
attention to important things. In a scientific way this is not result in a clear 
categorization or such a formal analytic possibility than the previous theory of public 
goods. Later MUSGRAVE also admitted it in an article ((Musgrave, 1996). There are 
people who consider the practical consequences drawn from the theory of meritoric 
good very dangerous because governmental intervention to the market relations 
(spending public money and the removal of additional taxes from the economy) may 
occur without its cause and the mechanism of action would be sufficiently determined 
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and assessed. Achieving the individual or social optimum usually originated in 
informational asymmetry (the consumer is not aware of danger or the long-term 
consequences, or underestimate them) or in strong external effects (benefits and harms 
appear not only for the consumer who make the decision but for everyone) or in the 
appearance of both effects. 
On pure theoretical base only external effects need allocative governmental 
intervention. Informational problems should be remedied not with providing public 
goods, but for example with informative work. Of course serious questions may arise 
about how the propaganda against smoking and alcohol consumption is effective. Or 
even publishing annual percentage rate of mandatory disclosure how much influence the 
decisions of borrowers. 
Finally, we have to mention that not only the production of public goods can occur at 
the level of private level (not for state order, but entirely without state intervention), but 
it is also frequent that private goods are produced at the level of the state or them 
distribution with governmental tools. A reason for this is the above mentioned problem 
of meritoric goods. Close relation of a certain public good or common goods provided 
by the state or a toll good due to technology or traditions also result in the governmental 
allocation of private goods. For example, beside medical services the so-called 
additionally provided „hotel services” (food, accommodation, laundry, etc.) at the 
hospital. In many places—also in Hungary—an important dilemma of the health care 
financing reform how these financially two different types of services can be separated 
from each other. On an equitable basis it can be tolerated that the quality of hotel 
services may depend on solvency stronger within certain limits than medical service. 
3. Distinction of forests 
One of the studies that deal with the economical issue of the free use of Bavarian Forest 
National Park follows the next logical system (Allinger – Guleszkij, 2000). In the aspect 
of allocation it is reasonable if both excludability and rivalry do not exist. In case of a 
national park the exclusion of non-paying visitors is possible, but it has very high 
additional costs du to the technical construction of fencing, access control system and 
further identification. The problem of rivalry also appears partly. It should be 
determined that the increase in the number of visitors which kind of extra costs will 
cause (for example garbage collection). In the analyses it can be consider as negligible. 
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A significant part of the additional costs is the so-called crowding costs. Due to the high 
number of the visitors the hedonic value (utility) of the tranquility of the park and the 
smooth immersion in nature will decrease. Here, as so often this is not a pure public 
good. The state allocation: decision can be made about establishment and use after 
serious analyses of costs and benefits. 
Free use is appropriate if: 
 The costs resulting from crowed do not appear till the actual needs do not 
guarantee. 
 The costs of toll exceed the losses that can be avoided with the payment. 
The above mentioned BAVARIAN problem also appears in the practice of national 
forest holdings in Hungary. In many cases we found that according to the original 
MUSGRAVE classification neither pure public nor pure private goods are concerned. 
Obviously, there are differences between large forests far from densely populated cities, 
park forests around the cities and the arboretums containing special plant rarities. 
In the first case, the realization of exclusion is economically not rational and also the 
establishment of some kind of toll system. If we can achieve with proper 
communication that visitors stay away from activities that directly damages nature, the 
crowding costs related additional—if they are not negligible—but certainly less than the 
costs of exclusion, and also the expected revenues are not likely to could financed the 
additional costs. 
With arboretums the situation is completely different, because the protection of the 
rare plants that they contain (prevention of excessively high additional costs in the 
aspects of economy) alone explains the control of the number of visitors. Although in 
many cases the entrance to arboretums owned by the national forest holdings is free 
(due to social reasons). Thus the costs of exclusion will exceed the additional reduction 
of costs that can achieve. Added to this is also suggested that at certain times (for 
example rhododendron bloom) the demand for visiting arboretums is so high, that it 
may be appropriate to reduce the payment and also due to high demand fees—even 
modest—can contribute to the maintenance of the institution. 
The case of park forests that located near cities is between the previous two 
examples, where the additional costs are outstanding due to the huge number of visitors, 
at the same time due to smaller extent; fencing and the exclusion of incompetent visitors 
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are in a technically and economically possible range. It should be also consider that 
what are the health and cultural benefits that regular visits of the forests cause and how 
much it will reduce if it will also act on the solvent demand. 
After this problem cannot be solved with positivist approach, application of utility 
variables derived from social preferences are needed, without this only premature, 
shortsighted pro or contra decisions can be made. Significant methodological and 
practical advances can be achieved if the above mentioned theoretical, historical 
problems of public goods production can be applied empirically for some partial aspects 
of social welfare utility of national forest holdings in Hungary with the tools of cost-
benefit analysis. 
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